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The Federal Aviation Administration is charged with maintaining a wide range of electronic 
facilities. These facilities range from pole mounted marker beacons, used as portions of an 
instrument landing system to Air Route Trafnc Control Centers, responsible for thousands of 
cubic miles of air space. Becaue of the positioning and physical requirements of these facilities 
they are frequently subject to lightning related surges and transients as well as direct strikes. In 
recent years, FAA has embarked on a program replacing older tube type electronic equipment 
with newer solid state equipment. This replacement program has dramatically increased the 
susceptibility of FAA's facilities to lightning related damages. 
This paper presents the author's proposal of techniques which may be employed to lessen the 
susceptibility of new FAA electronic facility designs to failures resulting from these causes. The 
general concept espoused is one of a consistent system approach employing both perimeter and 
internal protection. It compares the technique presently employed to reduce electronic noise 
with other techniques which reduce noise while lowering susceptibility to lightning related 
damage. It is anticipated that these techniques will be employed in the design of an ATCT in 
a high isokeraunic area. This facility would be subjected to rigorous monitoring over a multi- 
year period to provide quantitative data hopefully supporting the advantages of this design. 
INTRODUC'IION 
Threat levels within FAA Southern Region facilities are characterized by a relatively low incidence 
of locally generated power line switching transients, unlike many industrial facilities. Typically 
the power line transients experienced at these facilities are from lightning generated surges, either 
locally or to the power distribution grid. Switching transients generated by the local power utility; 
or switching transients from industrial neighbors are far fewer and less likely to inflict damage 
on the facility. Lightning generated surges have been identified as the cause of the majority of 
the power line related surges which resulted in equipment failures. Dlrect strikes to FAA 
facilities are quite common and have been recorded on video tape on several occasions. FAA 
facilities on airports are interconnected with a web of signal, control and data cable which are 
also susceptible to lightning related transients. 
Since the loss of FAA facilities may significantly impact the safety of the flying public, a 
stringent, rational as well as cost effective, approach to protection is warranted. The specious 
argument that protection should be implemented regardless of cost is totally unrealistic. 
Maintenance costs; facility and equipment purchase, and installation; and lightning protection all 
impact system reliability and thus flying safety while vying for the same budgetary dollar. 
KEYS TO PROPER DESIGN 
The scientist or engineer confined in a laboratory or office environment will flnd it difficult to 
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identify all possible situations extant within the field environment. The complexities associated 
with the protection of a specific facility are extensive. Isokeraunic levels, thunderstorm strength, 
soil type, distribution system characteristics, relative and absolute elevation, soil moisture and 
composition, and equipment susceptibility levels are among the principal considerations. A 
rational approach to specific site design must examine these parameters and assign importance 
to each variable. This awareness of the impact of the environment is the AfBt key to proper 
design. 
Education is the second key to proper design. It is not possible to properly incorporate a given 
element of protection within a system of protection if the purpose and operation of that element 
is not understood. The impact of protective elements must be evaluated both during their normal 
operation and in a failure mode, A device connected in series with the power line which fails 
open is every bit as dangerous if not more dangerous than a surge which damages a component 
within the facility. 
Regardless of the pains taken in designing an effective lightning protection system, all efforts are 
useless if the technicians charged with maintaining the system are unaware of the techniques 
employed. 
Education is an ongoing process. Engineers charged with generating specific facility designs must 
have avdable support from engineers specializing in the application of lightning protection, 
grounding, bonding and shielding. For this reason, the educational process must flow in two 
directions. From the project engineer to the specialist engineer must flow information on the 
physical environment, regulatory environment, and constraints of purpose. From the speciabt 
engineer to the project engineer must flow information on design goals, design techniques, device 
utilization and solutions to specific design problems. The accuracy of the data flowing In each 
direction will have a direct bearing on some elements of the data flowing in the opposite 
direction. 
The third key to a proper design is a consistent review process. AU facility designs, regardless 
of how simple, should be passed to the specialist engineer for review of the adequacy of design. 
Additionally, the review of these facility plans by field personnel prior to the letting of contracts 
will frequently prevent costly mistakes. Another s o m e  of loss of effectiveness hi the failure to 
properly monitor the construction of the facility. 
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LIOHTNINO PROTECTION 
PRESENT FAA TECHNIQUES 
FAA utilizes a system of lightning, surge, and tranalent protection based on &e C u n C q t  of 
creating an envelope of protection around the perimeter of the facility. This concept is mandated 
for all new construction or major modification by FAA-STD-019. This concept of protection 
is stil l  valid but the lower threshold of smceptibility which is becoming apparent in recent 
procurements is such that improvements should be made. 
The present aptem begins With the incorporation of integral, structural lightning protection. Tbh 
protection is established to comply with NFPA-78, the Lightning Protection Code. The FAA 
system is designed to meet or exceed this code in all aspects. The syetem incorporates air 
terminals (lightning rods) which provide a zone of protection baaed on a 150' radius arc. 
A loop electrode constructed of #4/0 AWO bare copper cable is burled 2 ft deep around the 
facility approximately 2 to 4 feet outside of the building foundation (or drip he). The typical 
grounding system8 utilizes 10' by 3/4" copper clad ground rods spaced 20 feet apart around the 
counterpoise. These ground rods (earth electrodes) are exothermically welded to the 4/0 loop. 
All conductive paths entering the facility are bonded to this loop. 
All power, control, or signal lines which penetrate the structural envelope should be equipped 
wlth rurge/tran~ient protection. This protection may include ailicon avalanche suppreerrors (SAS), 
metal oxide varistors (MOV), or gas discharge device& Carbon block type arrestera are found 
in some telco equipment but are not commonly installed by the FAA These devlces are 
frequently incorporated into hybrid protection circuits installed at signal demarcs. Crowbar 
portions of these hybrld circuits are typically bonded dhectly to the external loop electrode. The 
clamp element is bonded to the intemal multipoint grounding system. 
The internal facility grounding Bptem consists of three interconnecting grounds. The NEC 
required safety ground fs incorporated M required for code compliance. All non-current carrying 
elements of the premises equipment are bonded to the grounding conductor. A recond 
multipoint ground system ia established which connects to the loop electrode with a 500 kcmil 
cable terminated at the main electronic ground plate. This plate 8ems 88 an interconnection 
point with the third, single-point, grounding sptem. 
The multipoint grounding system utilizes building steel, where available and incorporates h m s  
such as ducts, cable trays, and conduits to create a grid of conductors. Where building steel is 
unavailable, 2000cmil/foot cables are utilized to interconnect the plates in this 8y8tem. All rack8 
and chassis are connected to this syatem. 
The single-point ground system utilizes isolated plates and dedicated SOoCmiVfoot cablea 
constructed in a star or tree pattern to ensure a aingle path to the main electronic ground plate. 
This system is designed to eliminate the sptem noise cawed by loop currents. 
PROTECX'ION FOR THE FUTURE 
It hg8n to become apparent In the late 1980's that the present FAA method of grounding was 
in8ufticient to provide the protection required for increasingly sophisticated facilities. A 
rethbkhg of the bade techniques wan required which drew on numerous documents including 
FIPS PUB-94. A sioniflcant conaideration for a new deaign was the ability to retrofit it to 
exiathrp facilities and to eatabbh it in facilities without 8ignificant amounts of building Iteel. 
An additional problem appeared to result from the me of the single point ground Wtem to 
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minfmize system nofse. Constituent elements of sptems which were directly connected to 
landlines were bed118 protected while elements which were deeper in the system were receiving 
lightning related damage. It appeared that the poor bonding due to high frequency impedance 
inherent in a cable grounding system was allowing large voltage differentials to form between the 
elements. It was also apparent that a single compromise of a single point system multed in a 
multipoint system with a single loop. This single loop system was found to be the noisiest 
possible ground. 
New FAA air trafEc control tower (ATCT) designs are on the drawing board. These new designs 
have tower h a f t s  300' tall. The direct strike risk associated with these towers mandates that we 
must assume that they will be struck on a regular basla when located in areas of even moderate 
fsokeraunic activity. Protection for the electronics equipment located within these structures must 
be of a nature to prevent damage from t h i s  type of a strike. 
1 
In essence, these ATCTs incorporate two separate facilities within a single structure. These 
facilities are located over 300' apart. The first of these facilities is the terminal radar control and 
it's associated electronics located In the base building. The other facility is the ATCT cab and 
it's associated electronics located at or near the top of the tower shaft. The fact that this 
separation is p- vertical enhances the voltage dffferential which is likely to be imposed 
upon them. Typically the tower shaft ls constructed of precast, interlockhg concrete modules. 
This construction technique reduces the vertical metallic elements to such items as metal 
staircases, cable trays, conduits and piping. External down conductors are utilized for the 
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structural lightning protection. 
PROTECTINO THE TOWER TOP EQUIPMENT 
Good design technique, €or the reduction of electrical mise, locates signal and control a8 
far as possible from electrical Wiring within the tower shaft. The utilization of flber opUc cab- 
between these facilities will minimize the threat of transients and noise coupled through the signal 
and control cabling. The power system fs left as the single greatest threat other than a direct 
strike to the equipment located at the top of the tower shaft. 
The first element of protection for the tower top facilfty is to establish a grounding grid or near 
equipotential plane for each level. These levels are interconnected with solid backed cable trayti. 
These cable trap are supplemented with copper cabling to ensure the lowest porsible impedance 
between thee levels. These grids are connected to earth with a 5OOkcmil cable. The hpedmce 
of this cable ls such that it cannot prevent differences In potential between the 2 facUUm. The 
nature of this protection system is such that we recognize this effect but protect in a manner so 
as to render it inconsequential. 
The electrical power feed is brought into a service entrance at the microwave level. A secondary 
surge arrester is provided at this point. T h e  grounded conductor (neutral) is bonded to the 
grounding electrode conductor and to the grounding conductor at thie point. The normal mode 
surge arrester is C O M W ! ~ ~ ~  between the phase conductom and the grounded conductor. The 
power ground and the grounding a d  are interconnected at the microwave level through a main 
ground plate. The main ground plate functions as an interconnection point between the 
grounding grid and a single point ground syatem, if one is requited'. The power feed for the 
levels is provided through a UPS system with critical power centers on each level. This minimizes 
stress between the power feed and dgnal and control elements. 
Emergency communication equipment located withiu the tower cab is connected directly to 
antennas mounted on the tower roof. The coaxial cabling for these emergency transceivers ts 
I .  Some equipment manufacturers mandate that an isolated ground be estabbhed for their 
equipment. 
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brought from the roof, where the shield is bonded to the structural lightning protection system, 
to the microwave level. At thi~ point it is connected through a bullthead plate utilizing a gas type 
surge protection device. The bulkhead plate is connected to the grounding pid on the 
microwave level. By connecting the bulkhead plate on the microwave level we minimize the 
Merentid between levels due to current flow from this source. 
The utilization of flber optic cabling between the tower top equipment and the base building 
equipment obviates the need for transient protection for the signal and control wiring. If there 
is a metal sheath on the fiber optic cable for physical protection this is bonded to the grounding 
grid at the microwave level. 
PROTECTINO THE BASE BUILDINO EQUIPMENT 
MMY of the techniques utilized in protectinn the tower top environment are amlied in the base 
building. The first element is the ekabhh-ent of a gro&ding grid or near Ghpotential plane 
for all equipment arw. The base bullding electronicci are typically located on a single level. A 
raised floor extendiug under equipment room and the operational area is equipped with a 
grounding grld bonded to a conductive, rigid or bolted stdnger, rallied flooring ~ystem. The floor 
system and grid are interconnected at every other stanchion. This floor is bonded as frequently 
a8 possible to the building steel if available or alternatively to the loop electrode with 500 kcmil 
cable at a minlmum of four points. The building steel is bonded to the loop electrode at 
alternate columna with #2/0 AWO bare copper cabling. 
The electrical power feed ie brought into a service entrance located in an emergency engine 
generator and power distribution room. A s e c o n w  surge arrester is provided at this point. 
The grounded conductor (neutral) Is bonded to the grounding electrode conductor at thie point 
and is in turn bonded to the grounding conductor. The normal mode surge arreater is connected 
between the phase conductors and the grounded conductor. The power feed for the levels is 
provided through a UPS system with a critical power center, connected 88 a separately derived 
source, in the equipment room. 
A h g l e  point of entry for signal, control, and power cabling is utilized to minimize differentials 
at the point where the cables enter the raised floor area. Fiber optic cabling is utilized to the 
maximum extent possible for the signal and control cabling. These flber optics are not expected 
to be all incluive, however. Primary transient protection for these cabla is provided at the 
building entrance with gas discharge and MOV devices connected to the loop counterpoise. 
Secondary protection with rilicon avalanche suppmson is provided at the entrance to the raiaed 
floor area. Protection at the equipment is also required to be included on equipment 
manufactured to FAA specifications. The near equipotential plane functions as a means of 
minimidno the differentials due to the protective devices firing. 
Cable entrances to the facility are through rigid metal (ferrous) conduit. This conduit extende 
10 feet beyond the loop electrode and is bonded to it. Cable annor is also bonded out to the 
loop electrode. 
Emergency communication equipment located within the operational area is connected directly 
to antennas mounted on the tower roof. The coaxial cabling for these emergency tramceivers 
is brought from the roof, where the shield is bonded to the structural lightning protection sptem, 
to the base building level. At this point it is connected through a bulkhead plate u- a gas 
type surge protection device. The bulkhead plate is directly connected to the loop conductor 
with a #2/0 AWO copper cable. 
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SUMMARY 
The present FAA concept of an envelope of protection is valid but it is necessary to carry the 
process a step further. Widely separate areas withi? a single structure must each have their own 
envelope of protection. The areas so protected must have a grounding system which minimizes 
the differentials within the envelope. All cabling entering the envelope must be closely referenced 
to this grounding system. 
Even the best design can be compromised by poorly trained installers or technicians responsible 
for maintaining the system. The training of these people is every bit as critical as the proper 
design for protection. 
The best general concept will usually fail to include in consideration at least one weak point. 
Lightning will ultimately find this point and cause damage within the facility. At this point the 
engineer must perform an in depth analysis to determine the weak point and protect it. When 
protecting this weak point it is important to consider the affect that this new protection will have 
on the overall system so as not to just move the problem. 
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